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As JPEG is the most widely used image format, the importance of tampering detection for JPEG images in
blind forensics is self-evident. In this area, extracting effective statistical characteristics from a JPEG im-
age for classification remains a challenge. Effective features are designed manually in traditional methods,
suggesting that extensive labor-consuming research and derivation is required. In this paper, we propose a
novel image tampering detection method based on deep multi-scale discriminative networks (MSD-Nets).
The multi-scale module is designed to automatically extract multiple features from the discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT) coefficient histograms of the JPEG image. This module can capture the characteristic informa-
tion in different scale spaces. In addition, a discriminative module is also utilized to improve the detection
effect of the networks in those difficult situations when the first compression quality (QF1) is higher than
the second one (QF2). A special network in this module is designed to distinguish the small statistical differ-
ence between authentic and tampered regions in these cases. Finally, a probability map can be obtained and
the specific tampering area is located using the last classification results. Extensive experiments demon-
strate the superiority of our proposed method in both quantitative and qualitative metrics when compared
with state-of-the-art approaches.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of image acquisition tools and the popularity of social me-
dia, digital images are now widely used and have become the major information carrier.
Due to the variety of available image processing tools, people can easily modify an im-
age in any way they want [Li et al. 2017a; Li et al. 2017b]. As a result, current digital
technology has begun to erode trust in visual imagery in many fields, such as journal-
ism, military, justice, commerce, medical applications, and academic research [Farid
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Fig. 1. Overview of our approach. The deep multi-scale discriminative networks contain a multi-scale mod-
ule to extract features in different scale spaces and a discriminative module to judge whether another special
network should be chosen for detection. Based on the final classification results, it is possible to determine
whether the input image block is tampered or not.
2009; Liu and Chen 2014; Korus and Huang 2016; Chen et al. 2017; Dong et al. 2015].
Consequently, digital image forensics, which aims to identify the original source of an
image or determine whether or not the content of an image has been modified, has
become increasingly important.
Since JPEG is the image format used by most digital devices, research into JPEG-
related forensics has attracted significant attention [Liu et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2012;
Thing et al. 2013]. JPEG compression identification on bitmaps and double compres-
sion detection on JPEG images are two main research topics in JPEG forensics. The
goal of JPEG compression identification on bitmaps is to detect the tampering traces
of an image that has been previously JPEG-compressed and stored in lossless format.
Thai et al. [Thai et al. 2017] proposed an accurate method for estimating quantization
steps from a lossless format image that has experienced JPEG compression. Yang et
al. [Yang et al. 2015] proposed a novel statistic named factor histogram for estimat-
ing the JPEG compression history of bitmaps. Li et al. [Li et al. 2015a] provided a
novel quantization noise-based solution to reveal the traces of JPEG compression. In
this paper, we focus on double compression forensics on JPEG images. Many forensics
techniques are inapplicable to JPEG images because compression can weaken certain
traces of image tampering. However, recompression often appears when the JPEG im-
age is tampered with and re-saved in JPEG format [Yang et al. 2014]. These processes
will leave specific traces of double compression; consequently, many related methods
aim to detect double JPEG compression from histograms of the Discrete Cosine Trans-
form (DCT) coefficient [Nguyen and Katzenbeisser 2013]. Several works analyze or
model the effect of JPEG compression. Yang et al. [Yang et al. 2016] presented a the-
oretical analysis on the variation of local variance caused by JPEG compression. Li
et al. [Li et al. 2015b] presented a statistical analysis of JPEG noises, including the
quantization noise and the rounding noise during a JPEG compression cycle.
The existing techniques for JPEG compression can be classified into two categories:
the traditional method and the deep learning method. Many traditional algorithms for
double JPEG compression have yielded relatively accurate detection results. Luka´sˇ
and Fridrich [Luka´sˇ and Fridrich 2003] estimated the primary quantization matrix
and presented a periodicity of DCT coefficient histograms due to double compression.
Popescu and Farid [Popescu and Farid 2004] put forward some statistical correlations
caused by digital tampering and analyzed the Double Quantization (DQ) effect. How-
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ever, these methods cannot locate specific area that has been tampered. Lin et al. [Lin
et al. 2009] first proposed a fine-grained tampered image detection method that can lo-
cate the tampered region by investigating the DQ effect on DCT coefficients. Bianchi et
al. [Bianchi et al. 2011] designed a probability map to distinguish between tampered
and original regions. Bianchi and Piva [Bianchi and Piva 2012] proposed a kind of
forensic algorithm to locate forged areas in JPEG format images by computing a likeli-
hood map to represent the probability of each small DCT block being compressed once
or twice. By modeling the DCT coefficient histograms as a mixture, the probability of
blocks being tampered was obtained to locate tampered regions [Wang et al. 2014][Yu
et al. 2016]. Liu [Liu 2017] utilized ensemble learning with nearly 100000-dimensional
features from the spatial domain and from the DCT transform domain to address the
challenging detection problems when QF1>QF2. Another type of traditional method
is based on Benford’s law. Fu et al. [Fu et al. 2007] utilized a Benford’s law-based sta-
tistical model to distinguish between the tampered and authentic images, as the DCT
coefficients of single compressed images obey the law but double compressed images
do not. Li et al. [Li et al. 2008] utilized mode-based first digit features to detect double
compressed images and identify the primary quality factor of JPEG compression.
Almost all traditional methods require some artificially designed features for de-
tection. However, designing such features is sometimes difficult and requires a large
amount of theoretical research and experimentations. Another drawback is that tradi-
tional methods may disable detection when QF1>QF2 due to the small difference be-
tween the statistical features of a tampered image and an authentic image in this case.
Recently, deep neural network (DNN) in image processing and computer vision [Tang
et al. 2015; Yan and Shao 2016; Fu et al. 2016; Hu et al. 2017] has been used with great
success when applied to the image forensics field. Baroffio et al. [Baroffio et al. 2016]
proposed a deep learning method to solve the problem of camera source identification.
Chen et al. [Chen et al. 2015] utilized a convolutional neural network (CNN) to detect
median filtering operations in images. Bayar and Stamm [Bayar and Stamm 2016] uti-
lized a new convolutional layer to detect universal image manipulation and proposed
a network structure based on actual forensic evidence. In double JPEG compression
forensics, Wang and Zhang [Wang and Zhang 2016] explored eight different CNNs to
solve the tampering localization problem; in this study, eight networks were trained on
single-compressed images and double-compressed images with different QF2. In an es-
timation of QF2, one corresponding network is selected to detect the tampered regions.
However, this method extracts features directly without taking full account of some
characteristics of the double JPEG compression process, limiting the improvement of
the detection effect. Finally, this method does not propose a solution for tougher cases
where QF1>QF2, which is also a general difficulty for most existing methods. Amerini
et al. [Amerini et al. 2017] explored the use of a spatial domain CNN and its combina-
tion with the histograms of DCT for the image forgery detection. The author suggested
that further research is in progress. Barni et al. [Barni et al. 2017] utilized CNNs in
pixel domain, noise domain and DCT domain to perform detection task respectively.
This method can obtain comprehensive information from a JPEG image but is quite
complicated.
In this paper, we propose a novel method of deep multi-scale discriminative net-
works (MSD-Nets) for double JPEG compression forensics to detect tampered regions
automatically. This generalization method does not require an estimation of QF1 and
the networks can detect JPEG images with any QF2. The multi-scale module consists
of a combination of three single-scale networks connected in parallel [Zhang et al.
2016][Korus and Huang 2017]. This module is designed to extract features from the
histograms of DCT coefficient after preprocessing, and is better able to describe the
effective features in different scale spaces than its single-scale counterparts. The out-
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Fig. 2. Example of image tampering model: (a) source image A with a selected region A1, (b) original image
B, (c) tampered image C.
puts of these networks are fused with different weights. A discriminative module then
follows behind to judge whether another specially designed network should be chosen
for the detection task. This module can improve the ability of our networks to distin-
guish the small statistical difference between a tampered region and an authentic re-
gion when QF1>QF2, which most existing methods can not do. After detecting all the
blocks of a JPEG image, a specific probability map of the detection result is obtained
and a precise localization of the tampered area is achieved. Fig. 1 visualizes the whole
framework of our proposed method. The experimental results on the Synthetic and
Florence datasets demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art
traditional methods and a representative deep method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the features to be ex-
tracted are introduced, after which the MSD-Nets for double JPEG compression foren-
sics are presented in Section III. The experimental results, and analysis are included
in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
2. FEATURES IN DOUBLE JPEG COMPRESSION
In this section, the image tampering model and the DQ effect are first described. From
these statistical characteristics, useful features to be employed in solving the binary
classification problem of double JPEG compression forensics are extracted. Finally, the
difference between DCT coefficient histograms in single and double compression situ-
ations is evaluated, showing the effectiveness of the features utilized in our networks.
2.1. Image Tampering Model
In the JPEG compression process, an input image is first divided into many 8 × 8
blocks, after which the discrete cosine transform is applied to every block. After the
quantization process, a rounding function is applied to the DCT coefficients. These
quantized DCT coefficients are later encoded via entropy encoding. The main reason
for compression information loss lies in the quantization process [Thai et al. 2016],
whose quantization table is related to a particular compression quality factor from 0
to 100 in the form of an integer. As we know, a higher quality factor represents a lower
amount of losses of image information, vice versa.
Image tampering is often accompanied by double JPEG compression. Traditionally,
the process of image splicing includes three steps, as shown in Fig. 2. These steps are
as follows:
1) Choosing a compressed JPEG image B, the quality factor of which is QF1, and
decompressing it.
2) Replacing a region of B with a selected region A1 from another image A.
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Fig. 3. Examples of different histograms in the DCT coefficients position (0,1): (a), (b), (c) single-compressed
image when QF1 = 50, QF1 = 70, and QF1 = 90; (d), (e), (f) double-compressed image when (d) QF1 = 50,
QF2 = 90, (e) QF1 = 70, QF2 = 90, and (f) QF1 = 90, QF2 = 85.
3) Saving the new tampered image C in JPEG format with a quality factor QF2,
where B1 represents the authentic region of B.
In this model, B1 is considered to be doubly compressed. If A is in non-JPEG format,
A1 is undoubtedly singly compressed. However, if A is in JPEG format, A1 is regarded
as a region that does not follow the law of double compression, as the DCT grids of
A1 have a very low probability ( 164 ) of matching B1. Accordingly, C is regarded as an
image with a singly compressed region A1 and a doubly compressed region B1.
2.2. Double Quantization Effect
In the JPEG compression process, the main reason for information loss is quantiza-
tion, which can leave traces from the histograms of the DCT coefficient. Here, the DQ
effect causes periodic peaks and valleys in histograms after the process of double JPEG
compression.
Fig. 3 illustrates the difference between double-compressed DCT coefficient his-
tograms and single-compressed DCT coefficient histograms. From Fig. 3, we can see
that the histograms of single-compressed images are generally in accordance with a
generalized Gaussian distribution, but the histograms of double-compressed images
have periodic peaks and valleys due to the DQ effect. When QF1>QF2, the statistical
properties of a double-compressed images are easily concealed by double compression.
Thus, tampering detection becomes a tough problem in this situation.
To solve the problem of double JPEG compression forensics by classifying the singly
and doubly compressed parts of a JPEG image, the DCT coefficient histograms are
utilized as the input features.
2.3. Tampering Detection Features
In order to obtain the features that can be directly input into the networks, some
pre-processing operations are needed. The DCT coefficients from the header file of
a JPEG image are extracted first. The DCT coefficients contain a direct current (DC)
coefficient and multiple alternating current (AC) coefficients. Taking an 8×8 DCT block
as an example, the DC coefficient is the first number of the DCT coefficient matrix,
and AC coefficients are the other 63 numbers. In this paper, only AC coefficients with
distributions that are different from the DC coefficients are selected to remove the
impact of DC coefficients.
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Length = 31
Zigzag order DCT Coefficient Histograms
1
9
Fig. 4. The illustration of building histograms of DCT coefficients: (1) select the second to the tenth coeffi-
cients which are arranged in zigzag order, (2) extract the histograms with a length of 31 from each coefficient
to construct the final features. Note only three blocks and three histograms are shown for succinctly explain-
ing. Different colors are used to distinguish different blocks.
Because of the variable sizes of the histograms, and for the purpose of controlling
the computational consumption without losing significant information, a symmetric
interval containing the peak of the histogram is selected as the features. Fig. 4 shows
a more detailed illustration. First, the second to the tenth coefficients, which are ar-
ranged in zigzag order, are chosen to organize the primary features. Then, the values
of the positions {−15,−14, . . . , 14, 15} are utilized to construct the final features. If F
represents the feature set of a block from a JPEG image, and Hi(x) represents the his-
togram of DCT coefficients corresponding to the position x at the ith frequency form
the zigzag order of the block, we have the following vector:
F = {Hi(−15), Hi(−14), . . . ,Hi(−2), Hi(−1),
Hi(0), Hi(1), Hi(2), . . . ,Hi(14), Hi(15)},
i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 9, 10}.
(1)
Therefore, a 279 (9 × 31) length feature vector is obtained from each JPEG image
block. The parameter selection will be explained in the last part of Section IV.
3. TAMPERING DETECTION VIA MSD-NETS
In this section, our proposed model will be described in detail. During the preprocess-
ing process, the histograms of DCT coefficient from a 64 × 64 block of a JPEG image
are first extracted. After that, three networks trained by different scale data can au-
tomatically extract the different statistical features of the same histograms. Then, a
discriminative module is employed to judge whether another special network should be
chosen for detection, which is designed to improve classification accuracy for tougher
cases when QF1>QF2. A special network in the discriminative module can distinguish
the small statistical difference between a tampered region and an authentic region in
this case. Finally, a proposed localization scheme is utilized to obtain the probability
map and simultaneously output the last two classification results.
3.1. Network Architecture
In order to solve the problem of double JPEG compression forensics, DNN is utilized
to automatically extract the features from the DCT coefficient histograms and classify
them. Our method does not need to estimate the first compression quality factor of
the JPEG image, but instead utilizes a scheme of overall training. The image blocks,
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Deep Multi-scale Discriminative Networks for Double JPEG Compression Forensics A:7
Table I. The architecture of a single network structure.
Layer Input Conv1 Pool1 Conv2 Pool2 Full1 ReLUs Full2 ReLUs Full3 Softmax Output
Size 279×1 277×1×100 138×1×100 136×1×100 67×1×100 1000×1 1000×1 1000×1 1000×1 1000×1 2×1 2×1
Kernel - 3×1 3×1 3×1 3×1 - - - - - - -
Stride - 1 2 1 2 - - - - - - -
Feature Map - 100 - 100 - 1000 - 1000 - - - -
Property - - Max - Max - - - - - - -
Initialization
(Weight, Bias)
- Xavier
Constant
- Xavier
Constant
- Xavier
Constant
- Xavier
Constant
- Xavier
Constant
- -
which have quality factors ranging from 50 to 95, are utilized for training to update
the network parameters. In order to improve the effect of classification, four different
DNNs are designed with similar structures but different parameters for training and
testing.
The first part of MSD-Nets can be regarded as a three-channel structure for the
process of extracting different features. This structure is inspired by the findings of a
large number of experiments: namely, that the fusion of multi-scale networks trained
by image blocks at different scales can increase the valuable information in various
scale spaces for double JPEG compression tampering detection. This method of in-
creasing the input features can introduce more effective information for classification,
so that the characteristics of the network extraction are no longer limited to the single
feature. This facilitates the extraction of more diversified and detailed information so
that a better classification result can be obtained.
The pre-trained multiple DNNs can be utilized to extract the multi-scale features
of DCT coefficient histograms automatically and features are aggregated through a
process of weighted fusion. A three-scales model with three different networks, which
are trained by 64×64, is designed using 128×128 and 256×256 size blocks respectively.
Each kind of the block dataset consists of tampered and authentic blocks in the same
quantity. The network trained by 64 × 64 blocks can extract features in small-scale
space, while the network trained by 256×256 blocks can extract features in large-scale
space, ensuring the richness of the feature in various scale spaces. The specific model
selection will be explained in Section IV.
A variety of fusion methods have been tried, combining three kinds of features in the
fully connected layer or using another special DNN to automatically select the weights.
Finally, fixed weights have been found to yield better classification results. Therefore,
the result-oriented fixed weights are utilized in our multi-scale feature DNN. The fu-
sion process can be defined as:
S(1, 1) = w1 ∗ s1(1, 1) + w2 ∗ s2(1, 1) + w3 ∗ s3(1, 1),
S(2, 1) = w1 ∗ s1(2, 1) + w2 ∗ s2(2, 1) + w3 ∗ s3(2, 1),
s.t. w1, w2, w3 6 1, w1 + w2 + w3 = 1,
(2)
where S represents the result after the fusion process. s1, s2, and s3 represent the out-
put values after the softmax layer in three different networks. w1, w2, and w3 represent
the weights of 64× 64, 128× 128, and 256× 256 blocks respectively.
In Fig. 5, F1Score is utilized to compare the experimental results of our MSD-Nets
structure with a simple network on a 100000-block dataset. It is obvious that this spe-
cially designed structure for double JPEG compression forensics outperforms a simple
network structure.
In addition, a divide and conquer strategy is implemented in our proposed method.
Due to the statistical characteristics of the DQ effect, most of the existing schemes per-
form poorly when distinguishing the small statistical difference between a tampered
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Fig. 5. F1 Score of the proposed MSD-Nets structure and the simple network structure on (a) the Synthetic
dataset, (b) the Florence dataset.
region and an authentic region when QF1>QF2. Hence, some specific data (64 × 64
tampered image blocks in the case of QF1>QF2, and 64×64 image blocks without tam-
pering) are utilized to train a special DNN in our algorithm framework. This training
pattern ensures the effectiveness of the network when QF1>QF2. The detailed dis-
criminative module is described in Algorithm 1.
The architecture of a single channel network structure is shown in Table I. The
network contains two alternating convolutional layers, two pooling layers and three
fully connected layers. A softmax layer is utilized in the last of the structures to obtain
the classification probability of each class.
1) Convolutional Layer: A convolutional layer employs convolution and non-linearity
operations to the input data, reduces the number of free parameters and simultane-
ously improves generalization [Lin et al. 2016]. A 3 × 1 size kernel is selected and the
number of feature maps (that is, the number of kernels) is set to 100. The stride is set
to 1. Hence, each feature map becomes a vector with a size of 277 × 1 and the output
of the first convolutional layer becomes 277 × 1 × 100. Similarly, the output of the sec-
ond convolutional layer becomes 67 × 1 × 100. The concrete convolutional operation is
represented as:
xlj =
n∑
l=1
xl−1i ∗ wl−1ij + blj , (3)
where * represents convolution, xlj is the jth feature map of layer l, w
l−1
ij represents
the trainable weight that connects the ith feature map of layer l−1 with the jth feature
map of layer l, and blj represents the bias parameter of the jth feature map of layer l.
2) Pooling Layer: While the extracted features can be utilized for classification after
the convolutional layer, this may give rise to some challenges in calculation and be
prone to over-fitting. Hence a pooling layer which can combine the outputs of neuron
clusters into a single neuron is utilized [Ciresan et al. 2011] [Scherer et al. 2010] and
a max pooling selected to extract the maximum value from each of a cluster of neurons
at the prior layer. The size of the pooling is 3×1 and the stride is 2. Thus, only the max
value within the local area to the next layer is calculated.
3) Fully Connected Layer: The fully connected layer connects each neuron in one
layer to each neuron in another layer. The weights and the bias of the network can
be adaptively renewed in the fully connected layers because of the error propagation
procedure. Therefore, the last classification result will be fed back to automatically
guide the feature extracting process, after which the learning mechanism can be set
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Algorithm 1 Threshold-Based Discriminative Module Path Selection Algorithm
Input: S0: DCT coefficient histograms of input image blocks; F (1, 1): the first value of
the result after fusion; F (2, 1): the second value of the result after fusion; C: output
value of the special DNN; t: Threshold;
Output: Result of whether the block is tampered or not;
1: if |F (1, 1)− F (2, 1)|<t then
2: Compute the output C of the special DNN with the input of S0; Set C as the
final result;
3: if C(1, 1)>C(2, 1) then
4: The input block was manipulated.
5: else
6: The input block is authentic.
7: end if
8: else
9: Set F as the final result;
10: if F (1, 1)>F (2, 1) then
11: The input block was manipulated.
12: else
13: The input block is authentic.
14: end if
15: end if
up [LeCun et al. 1998]. In our network, the first two fully connected layers have 1000
outputs and the last one has 2 outputs.
4) ReLUs Nonlinearity: ReLUs is the abbreviation of Rectified Linear Units. Follow-
ing the first two fully connected layers, ReLUs is utilized because of its ability to facili-
tate fast convergence in some large models trained on some large datasets [Krizhevsky
et al. 2012]. This layer applies the non-saturating activation function as:
f(x) = max(x, 0), (4)
where x represents the input patch of the features.
Double JPEG compression tampering detection can be regarded as a two-
classification problem: doubly compressed region (authentic region) and singly com-
pressed region (tampered region). Hence, after a softmax layer, the classification prob-
ability of the two classes can be obtained. The parameter selection will be explained in
Section IV.
Meanwhile, we compare our method with SVM classifier which is mentioned in [Li
et al. 2008] by inputting the 279× 1 histograms into SVM classifier. Then we find that
SVM classifier has poor performance on these histograms. Most of the reason is that
traditional machine learning techniques usually have no ability to process raw data.
When the histograms are utilized for classification directly without handcrafted fea-
ture extraction, these techniques can hardly work. Hence, the actual benefits of deep
network is to achieve representation learning automatically and capture important
features easily for forensics.
3.2. Tampered Region Localization
In order to locate the tampered area more precisely, a M × N input JPEG image I is
first divided into many L × L overlapping blocks (L is set to 64 according to testing).
We then compute the DCT coefficient histograms H with a size of 279 × 1 from each
block, and input H to the MSD-Nets. The final probability pair is P (1, 1) and P (2, 1)
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after the softmax layer is obtained later. Finally, the value P (1, 1), which represents
the probability that the block is singly compressed (i.e. tampered), will be assigned to
the small 8 × 8 block in its center. Each overlapping block from image I has a small
8 × 8 block in its center, so the number n of these overlapping blocks from image I is
the same as the number of these small central blocks nc. Therefore, n can be computed
as:
n = nc =
(⌊
M − L
8
⌋
+ 1
)
∗
(⌊
N − L
8
⌋
+ 1
)
. (5)
After assigning all of the L × L blocks, a tampering detection probability map Pmap
with a size of 8 × n is obtained. Finally, the pixel values of the blocks on the edge of
Pmap are padded as 0 and a M × N tampering detection result map is obtained. The
whiter areas represent the higher probability that this particular block is tampered.
It is natural that the binary classification result map can be easily obtained with a
threshold of 0.5.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the results of extensive experiments in both quantitative and qualita-
tive metrics are provided and compared. We compare our method with two represen-
tative traditional methods [Bianchi and Piva 2012] [Yu et al. 2016] and a deep method
[Wang and Zhang 2016], denoted respectively as BP, YH, and WZ in plot legends. In
addition, we compare our method with a traditional method, named LA [Liu 2017]. For
fair comparison, we run BP, YH, and WZ according to their public codes, and reimple-
ment the algorithm of LA based on the original paper.
4.1. Dataset
UCID Dataset. One of the most widespread lossless datasets in image forensics: the
Uncompressed Color Image Database (UCID) [Gerald and Michal 2003]. The UCID
dataset contains 1338 images in TIFF format with a resolution of 512× 384.
Synthetic Dataset. This dataset was synthesized from UCID dataset. 1200 images
from UCID dataset are randomly selected for experiments (800 as training sets, 200 as
validating sets and 200 as testing sets). To create JPEG images for training, validating,
and testing, each original TIFF image is first compressed with a given quality factor
QF1 ∈ {50, 55, . . . , 90, 95}. The left 1/2 region that should not be doubly compressed is
then replaced with the corresponding region in the original image. Finally, the image
is compressed again with another quality factor QF2∈ {50, 55, . . . , 90, 95}. Each image
achieves 100 possible combinations of (QF1, QF2).
Florence Dataset1. The Image Dataset for Localization of Double JPEG compres-
sion (Florence Dataset) is a public dataset containing 100 full-resolution raw color
images from three different digital cameras: Nikon D90, Canon EOS 450D, and Canon
EOS 5D. These are converted to TIFF format images and compressed by 1/2, 1/16,
and 15/16 in this dataset. Only a 1024× 1024 region in the central position of each im-
age is utilized. The 1/2 compressed dataset is chosen for experiments (64 for training,
16 for validating and 20 for testing). This dataset is also utilized in the experiments
of [Bianchi and Piva 2012].
Finally, 1000 × 100 low-resolution synthesized JPEG images from the Synthetic
dataset and 100 × 100 high-resolution synthesized JPEG images from the Florence
dataset are obtained. The left half of each JPEG image is singly compressed, provid-
1ftp://lesc.dinfo.unifi.it/pub/Public/JPEGloc.
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Table II. Detection accuracy achieved on the Synthetic dataset.
QF1 Method
QF2
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
50
Proposed 0.5391 0.5251 0.5476 0.7378 0.9194 0.9557 0.9804 0.9808 0.9767 0.9758
BP 0.4756 0.5023 0.6136 0.7021 0.8955 0.8512 0.8981 0.9375 0.9339 0.9222
YH 0.5085 0.5111 0.5970 0.7080 0.8704 0.9225 0.8926 0.9020 0.9349 0.9170
WZ 0.5167 0.5080 0.5082 0.5048 0.4980 0.6126 0.7793 0.8466 0.9122 0.9365
LA 0.4986 0.5230 0.5653 0.7108 0.8223 0.8684 0.9217 0.9308 0.9455 0.9759
60
Proposed 0.5118 0.5040 0.5769 0.5150 0.7348 0.9109 0.9806 0.9769 0.9651 0.9880
BP 0.5195 0.4782 0.4300 0.5332 0.6748 0.8330 0.8571 0.8949 0.9264 0.9206
YH 0.5160 0.5026 0.4967 0.5531 0.7129 0.7259 0.9131 0.8910 0.9382 0.9144
WZ 0.5094 0.5061 0.5054 0.5028 0.5065 0.6689 0.8104 0.8238 0.9138 0.9332
LA 0.5323 0.5375 0.5000 0.5628 0.6463 0.7557 0.8233 0.8724 0.9205 0.9603
70
Proposed 0.4875 0.5328 0.6194 0.5204 0.5097 0.5902 0.9147 0.9535 0.9587 0.9746
BP 0.5804 0.4980 0.4736 0.4893 0.4473 0.5029 0.6787 0.8125 0.8893 0.9163
YH 0.5947 0.5332 0.4844 0.5000 0.4788 0.5137 0.7705 0.9098 0.9320 0.9242
WZ 0.5171 0.5091 0.5189 0.5054 0.5024 0.5083 0.7341 0.8542 0.8905 0.9284
LA 0.5810 0.6053 0.5799 0.5433 0.5010 0.5822 0.7410 0.8508 0.8995 0.9493
80
Proposed 0.5494 0.4947 0.6224 0.6463 0.7456 0.6822 0.5362 0.7614 0.9565 0.8941
BP 0.5000 0.5000 0.4993 0.5407 0.5000 0.4945 0.4622 0.5358 0.7331 0.8887
YH 0.5029 0.4993 0.5000 0.5101 0.5020 0.5007 0.4919 0.5306 0.8158 0.9261
WZ 0.5011 0.5042 0.5061 0.5031 0.5017 0.5258 0.5232 0.6737 0.8535 0.8548
LA 0.6162 0.6151 0.6509 0.6415 0.6353 0.6021 0.4994 0.6810 0.8220 0.8958
90
Proposed 0.4862 0.5754 0.5277 0.5647 0.5527 0.5150 0.5992 0.6936 0.5207 0.7344
BP 0.4694 0.5156 0.4290 0.4632 0.4951 0.5400 0.5020 0.5000 0.4987 0.7829
YH 0.5000 0.5000 0.5026 0.4935 0.5055 0.5205 0.4941 0.5000 0.5000 0.7738
WZ 0.5088 0.4990 0.5013 0.5061 0.5104 0.4955 0.5526 0.5931 0.5153 0.7662
LA 0.5936 0.5768 0.5895 0.5470 0.5419 0.6094 0.6711 0.5566 0.7012 0.7792
ing a convenient comparison process for experiments. This measure of processing data
facilitates to gain balanced samples from the same image in the following steps.
4.2. Quantitative Experiments
After generating a set of specific compressed images using the Synthetic dataset, crop-
ping is first performed to divide each image into many 64× 64 blocks, and 48 blocks on
the Synthetic dataset are obtained. Hence, a positive set with 24× 1000× 100 elements
and a negative set with the same number of elements on the Synthetic dataset are
obtained. Similarly, the number changes to 128× 80× 100 on the Florence dataset, and
128× 128 and 256× 256 block datasets are obtained in the similar way. The dataset uti-
lized in our discriminative module is rather special, as it consists of two parts: 64× 64
singly compressed blocks with QF1 > QF2, and 64× 64 doubly compressed blocks.
80% of the data is utilized for network training, with the remaining 20% being
used for validating. Three multi-scale feature DNNs and one special feature DNN
are trained. The very popular Caffe implementation [Jia et al. 2014] is utilized for
the training task. Because of the huge computation complexity of the network, our
experiments utilize NVIDIA GTX TITAN X to accelerate the process. The optimiza-
tion method we used is Stochastic Gradient Descent. The value of the learning rate is
0.0005. The batch-size is 200, and the momentum is set to 0.9. The number of epochs
is set to 20 to ensure network convergence.
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Table III. Detection accuracy achieved on the Florence dataset.
QF1 Method
QF2
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
50
Proposed 0.5328 0.5553 0.5701 0.7775 0.8635 0.8996 0.9174 0.9158 0.9298 0.9519
BP 0.5023 0.5739 0.6587 0.7004 0.8532 0.9071 0.9318 0.9407 0.9553 0.9148
YH 0.5204 0.3984 0.5215 0.6366 0.8373 0.9003 0.9310 0.9416 0.9563 0.9200
WZ 0.5178 0.4997 0.4728 0.4507 0.4288 0.6422 0.7071 0.6587 0.7222 0.9618
LA 0.5204 0.5517 0.6423 0.7648 0.8654 0.8815 0.8977 0.9090 0.9129 0.9225
60
Proposed 0.5502 0.5705 0.5791 0.6008 0.7981 0.9010 0.9106 0.9129 0.9361 0.9463
BP 0.5747 0.5401 0.4992 0.5975 0.7027 0.7661 0.8933 0.9111 0.9175 0.8733
YH 0.6018 0.6021 0.5137 0.5355 0.6295 0.7345 0.8871 0.9111 0.9218 0.8851
WZ 0.5445 0.5338 0.5135 0.4901 0.4599 0.6936 0.7514 0.6938 0.7909 0.9819
LA 0.5446 0.5240 0.5104 0.5794 0.6910 0.8271 0.8448 0.8771 0.8865 0.8975
70
Proposed 0.5586 0.5981 0.7525 0.6176 0.5863 0.7130 0.9113 0.9239 0.9229 0.9526
BP 0.5911 0.6063 0.5938 0.5336 0.5031 0.5912 0.8052 0.8815 0.9156 0.8691
YH 0.5996 0.6080 0.6262 0.5883 0.4843 0.5841 0.7771 0.8744 0.9175 0.8812
WZ 0.5969 0.5860 0.5631 0.5404 0.5186 0.4966 0.9442 0.7601 0.8220 0.9824
LA 0.6802 0.6492 0.5818 0.5292 0.5179 0.5817 0.7608 0.8198 0.8587 0.8756
80
Proposed 0.5375 0.5272 0.7905 0.7521 0.8448 0.8236 0.5569 0.8996 0.9253 0.9456
BP 0.5265 0.5467 0.5278 0.5505 0.5782 0.5457 0.4996 0.6449 0.8871 0.8572
YH 0.5075 0.5716 0.5508 0.5488 0.5936 0.5856 0.4878 0.5809 0.8814 0.8690
WZ 0.4816 0.4720 0.6495 0.5841 0.5635 0.5576 0.5251 0.8560 0.9240 0.9666
LA 0.5813 0.5881 0.7302 0.7237 0.6652 0.5767 0.5229 0.6777 0.7952 0.8288
90
Proposed 0.5507 0.5531 0.6910 0.6634 0.6937 0.6183 0.7692 0.8587 0.5482 0.9169
BP 0.5083 0.5053 0.5057 0.5034 0.5169 0.5112 0.5297 0.5557 0.5002 0.6473
YH 0.5113 0.5138 0.4926 0.4455 0.5466 0.6271 0.5104 0.6017 0.5708 0.7509
WZ 0.5029 0.5190 0.5561 0.5209 0.4959 0.5255 0.6884 0.7406 0.5021 0.9721
LA 0.5188 0.5375 0.5398 0.5162 0.5475 0.5594 0.6973 0.6606 0.5142 0.7021
For testing, the rest of the 200 images in the Synthetic dataset and 20 images in the
Florence dataset are utilized. After dividing each image into overlapping 64×64 blocks
with a stride of 8, these blocks are input into the MSD-Nets. In the weighted fusion
step, the weight w1 of 64 × 64 blocks is set to 0.8, the weight w2 of 128 × 128 blocks
is set to 0.1, and the weight w3 of 256 × 256 blocks is set to w3 = 1 − w1 − w2 = 0.1.
Subsequently, the final result map is obtained.
For quantitative experiments, the output probability map of the MSD-Nets is bina-
rized to generate the final result map with two regions: a single-compressed region
and a double-compressed region. Therefore, a pixel with a value of 0 represents being
doubly compressed, while a value of 1 represents being singly compressed.
Accordingly, the metrics accuracy (Acc) and F1Score can be measured as:
Acc =
TP + TN
P +N
, (6)
precision =
TP
TP + FP
, (7)
recall =
TP
TP + FN
, (8)
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Fig. 6. Results achieved on the Synthetic dataset by the proposed method and the comparison methods of
BP, YH, WZ, and LA. (a)-(b) average values of the detection accuracy and F1Score corresponding to QF2.
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Fig. 7. Results achieved on the Florence dataset by the proposed method and the comparison methods of
BP, YH, WZ, and LA. (a)-(b) average values of the detection accuracy and F1Score corresponding to QF2.
F1Score =
2 · precision · recall
precision+ recall
, (9)
where N is the total number of the single-compressed blocks, and P is the total num-
ber of the double-compressed blocks. True positive TP and true negative TN stand for
the numbers of blocks in double-compressed and single-compressed regions that are
correctly identified. FP and FN denote the number of blocks which are erroneously
detected as double-compressed blocks and the number of blocks that are falsely de-
tected as single-compressed blocks. F1Score is a comprehensive indicator of precision
and recall.
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:14 C. Deng et al.
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
BP
YH
WZ
LA
Proposed
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
BP
YH
WZ
LA
Proposed
QF2
F
1 
S
co
re
QF2
A
cc
ur
ac
y
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Results achieved on the Synthetic dataset by the proposed method and the comparison methods
of BP, YH, WZ, and LA when QF1>QF2. (a)-(b) average values of the detection accuracy and F1Score
corresponding to QF2.
The detection accuracy achieved on the Synthetic dataset and the Florence dataset
is shown in Table II and Table III. In order to ensure the integrity of the experiment,
the situation of QF1 = QF2 is retained.
Table II shows that the detection accuracies of our method are mostly 5 to 20 percent
higher than BP, YH and WZ in the case of QF1 ≥ QF2, especially when QF1 ∈ {80, 90}.
When QF1 ≥ QF2, the performance of our method are almost comparable to LA that
is specially designed for down-recompression discrimination. In almost all cases when
QF1 < QF2, the detection accuracies of our method are 5 to 25 percent higher than
other methods. Similarly, according to Table III, the detection accuracies of our method
are 5 to 15 percent higher than other methods, even higher than LA, in most cases of
QF1 ≥ QF2. When QF2 ∈ {60, . . . , 90}, the superiority of our method is more promi-
nent. In most cases of QF1 < QF2, the detection accuracies of our method are 5 to 25
percent higher than other methods, and the superior performances of our method are
especially evident when QF1 ∈ {60, 80}. Generally, depending on the superior capabil-
ity of the multi-scale module in feature extraction and the application of the discrim-
inative module to address the challenging detection problems when QF1 > QF2, our
method gains significantly higher accuracy when QF1 > QF2 as well as QF1 < QF2.
In order to compare different approaches more intuitively, we also draw some fig-
ures. Because of the fact that detection performance is related to QF1 and QF2,
we calculate the average values of Acc and F1Score for all the images in different
QF1 ∈ {50, 55, . . . , 90, 95}. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 illustrate the detection results on the Syn-
thetic and Florence datasets, respectively.
It is evident that our method outperforms other methods in terms of accuracy and
F1Score when QF1 > QF2 as well as QF1 < QF2. In general, the detection results
of each method are significantly worse when QF1 > QF2 or QF1 = QF2. Moreover,
as we can see, the accuracy of each method is no more than 60% in the case where
QF2 < 60. As the compression quality factor ranges from 50 to 95, the QF1 of each
image is almost higher than the QF2 in this case.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 illustrate the average detection results when QF1 > QF2 in dif-
ferent QF1 ∈ {50, 55, . . . , 90, 95}. We find that our method has significantly higher ac-
curacy and F1Score in this case. This greatly depends on the application of the dis-
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Fig. 9. Results achieved on the Florence dataset by the proposed method and the comparison methods
of BP, YH, WZ, and LA when QF1 > QF2. (a)-(b) average values of the detection accuracy and F1Score
corresponding to QF2.
Table IV. Comparison of the proposed method and LA on Synthetic dataset.
Method Average detection time Feature dimension Target area
LA 570 ms/pic 94976 Global detection
Proposed 60 ms/pic 279 Accurate location
criminative module. Moreover, the multi-scale module also contributes to the overall
improvement in detection.
These results show that our method has a notable superiority in double JPEG com-
pression forensics. In addition, based on the slightly different trends in the results on
the two datasets, our approach has more stable performance on the high-resolution
dataset.
Table IV shows the further comparison between our method and LA on Synthetic
dataset. Since our method uses a much smaller number of features (279-D) than LA
(nearly 100000-D), the average detection time of our method is 60ms for each picture,
almost 10 times faster than LA. Additionally, our method can accurately locate the
tampered area of the JPEG image but LA is often used to determine the authenticity
of the entire image.
4.3. Qualitative Experiments
To ensure the comprehensiveness of the experiment, we not only manually synthesize
JPEG images using Adobe Photoshop, but also manipulate JPEG images automati-
cally via Matlab. Fig. 10 shows the effectiveness and robustness of our method. We can
observe from the last two columns that there are almost no tampered regions in image
1 that conform to our cognition. Although the refrigerator in the original image 2 is
shrunken and inserted into another image, our method still yields a superior detection
result.
Additional results compared with the methods of BP, YH, and WZ on different
datasets are shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12. In order to ensure the diversity of the ex-
periment, images from different datasets are selected and tampered in different ways.
Fig. 11 shows the detection results of artificially tampered images on the Synthetic
dataset. It is evident that our method has fewer misclassified points. Simultaneously,
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Fig. 10. A group of successful results of the proposed approach: (a) an original image 1, (b) an original
image 2, (c) the tampered image 3 after narrowing, QF1 = 60, QF2 = 90, (d) the mask, (e) the classification
probability map of image 1, (f) the detection result map of image 1, (g) the classification probability map of
image 3, (h) the detection result map of image 3. In order to reflect the performance more intuitively, our
results have not been subjected to any filtering.
165.81 mm
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 11. Detection results on the Synthetic dataset: (a) original images, (b) tampered images compressed
with QF1 = 60, QF2 = 70, and QF1 = 80, QF2 = 70 (two at the top which are human unrecognizable due
to the reasonable semantic information they have),QF1 = 50,QF2 = 100, andQF1 = 80,QF2 = 60 (two at
the bottom which are easy to recognize due to the abnormal semantic information then have), (c) tampering
masks, (d)-(f) detection results of BP, YH, and WZ, (g) probability maps of our method, (h) detection results
of our method.
our method is rarely influenced by interference information, such as the content of the
sky in the second lines.
Fig. 12 shows the detection results of automatically synthesized images on the Flo-
rence dataset. The results show that our method is rarely affected by the content of
the image and performs better in cases of both QF1 < QF2 and QF1 > QF2, although
all of the methods perform worse when QF1 > QF2. When QF1 > QF2, the superior
performance of our method is derived from the discriminative module. The multi-scale
features extracted by our networks can help to improve the classification effect and
reduce the interference of the invalid information.
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Fig. 12. Detection results on the Florence dataset: (a) original images, (b) tampered images compressed
with QF1 = 60, QF2 = 70, and QF1 = 50, QF2 = 100 (two at the top), QF1 = 80, QF2 = 70, and
QF1 = 80, QF2 = 60 (two at the bottom) are automatically synthesized by Matlab, the central square area
of each image is replaced by a block with the same content, (c) tampering masks, (d)-(f) detection results of
BP, YH, WZ, (g) probability maps of our method, (h) detection results of our method.
Table V. The accuracy of detection using different parameters.
Dataset/Number of connections 1 conv 2 conv 3 conv 4 conv
Synthetic 0.687 0.690 0.682 0.685
Florence 0.726 0.738 0.733 0.734
Dataset/Kernel size 3× 1 5× 1 7× 1 9× 1
Synthetic 0.690 0.682 0.681 0.679
Florence 0.738 0.731 0.727 0.726
Dataset/Number of kernels 50 100 150 200
Synthetic 0.677 0.690 0.688 0.689
Florence 0.725 0.738 0.733 0.736
Dataset/Feature dimensions 11 21 31 41
Synthetic 0.661 0.683 0.690 0.686
Florence 0.682 0.704 0.738 0.740
Dataset/Network model Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Synthetic 0.677 0.685 0.679 0.690
Florence 0.723 0.734 0.728 0.738
4.4. Parameter Selection
In this section, many experiments are implemented in order to reveal the relationship
between global accuracy and parameter selection. Different DNN model parameters
and structures are tested to construct better networks and specify the network param-
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:18 C. Deng et al.
eters. Table V presents a comparison of the size of kernels, the number of convolutional
layers, the number of kernels, the dimension of features, and the model composed of
multiple networks which are trained by different scale data. Model1 to Model4 repre-
sent different network structures: 1) a network trained by 64× 64 blocks; 2) two fused
networks trained by 64 × 64 and 128 × 128 blocks; 3) two fused networks trained by
64× 64 and 256× 256 blocks; 4) three fused networks trained by 64× 64, 128× 128, and
256× 256 blocks. The values in Table V which are in bold represent the parameters or
structure we finally select.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel double JPEG compression forensics method based on deep
multi-scale discriminative networks. The multi-scale features extracted by the multi-
scale module derive more effective information from DCT coefficient histograms and
achieve better performance in the tampering detection process. With reference to the
statistical characteristics of the DQ effect, a discriminative module is also designed
to capture the small difference between authentic and tampered images in tougher
cases when QF1>QF2. Finally, the automatic localization of specific tampered regions
is realized. Extensive experimental results confirm that our MSD-Nets outperform
several state-of-the-art methods on two public datasets.
In the future, it will be necessary for us to design a pretreatment process for filtering
quantization noise. In addition, further efforts will be made to consider adding both
the image content information and semantic information to assist in double JPEG
compression forensics.
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